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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a default partial summary judgment 
granted for failure of one of the defendants, Bert Slavens, to 
appear for a deposition and thereat to produce documents. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
On March 10, 1975, the Court ordered defendant Slavens1 ans-
wer to be stricken for his failure to appear at his deposition and 
thereat to produce requested documents. Accordingly, the Court 
granted a default partial summary judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs against defendant Slavens. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
Defendant Slavens seeks a reversal of the default partial 
summary judgment against him and an order remanding the dispute 
for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal involves a default partial summary judgment which 
was rendered in a construction contract dispute in which a defen-
dant failed to appear at a deposition after being noticed and al-
so failed to produce the requested documents. In March of 1974 
suit was commenced against two partners, who were doing business 
as P.S. Construction Company. (Tr. 36) The partners, Bert Sla-
vens and Clinton Perry, had both agreed to construct a six-unit 
apartment building and a residence, both to be located in Duchesne, 
Utah. (Tr. 4) The price of the apartments was $71,025.00 and the 
house $19,000.00. (Tr. 4) Plaintiffs claim to have paid these 
amounts and, subsequently, there have been mechanic's liens filed 
against the property by subcontractors. The plaintiffs claim to 
have also paid some of these,later claims. (Tr. of pretrial 3) 
• ~2~ 
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On March 14, 1974, service of process was obtained in Green 
River, Wyoming, on defendant Slavens* (Tr. 7) On March 27, 1974, 
notice was given to defendant Slavens that he was to appear at 
10:00 ofclock on April 26, 1974, at the office of Hatch, McRae & 
Richardson, 370 East 5th South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, (Tr. 
9) to have his deposition taken. On March 27, 1974, Slavens' at-
torney, Gary Stott, was also served with a demand for production 
of specified documents (Tr* 13), which documents were to be pro-
duced at the scheduled deposition to be held April 26, 1974. 
Defendant Perry appeared and was deposed (Tr. 53), however, 
defendant Slavens failed to appear and also failed to produce 
the requested documents. (Tr. 17) On April 29, 1974, Gary Stott, 
who had been counsel for Slavens, withdrew as attorney for Slavens 
but continued to represent defendant Perry. No notice to appoint 
counsel nor to appear in person was ever given to Slavens. 
On May 21, 1974, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary 
judgment, which motion was based partially on Slavens1 failure 
to appear and his failure to produce documents at the April 26th 
deposition. (Tr. 18 and Tr. 9 of pretrial hearing) The motion 
had been made under the authority of sanctions authorized by Rule 
37 of the U.R.C.P. (Tr. 9 of the pretrial hearing), in which plain-
tiffs sought, among other relief, to strike Slavens1 answer. (Tr. 
17) Defendant Perry filed an objection to plaintiffs1 Motion and 
defendant Slavens, who, at this time was not represented by coun-
sel, failed to respond. (Tr. 17) On June 4, 1974, the motion for 
summary judgment was denied. (Tr. 2 4) However, almost a year la-
ter, on March 10, 1975, the Court reversed itself and ordered this 
previous denial set aside. (Tr. 52) On December 20, 1974, a pre-
-3- . 
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trial conference was. held (Tr. 28) , at which time S. Rex Lewis en-
tered an appearance as counsel for defendant Slavens* At; this pre-
trial hearing/ the plaintiffs1 motion for a summary judgment, pre-
viously denied, was discussed. (Tr. 28) The Court said it would 
re-examine the plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment (Tr, 8 of 
pretrial hearing) and the Court also allowed counsel, S. Rex Lewis, 
to file an amended pleading for defendant Slavens, which the Court 
agreed to consider. (Tr. 28) 
On December 24, 1974, an amended answer and counterclaim sup-
ported by counter-affidavits in response to plaintiffs1 affidavits 
were filed by counsel for Slavens. (Tr. 37) The clerk allowed 
this answer and counterclaim to be filed although the Court had 
not granted approval. On December 30, 1974, a counterclaim was 
•also filed by defendant Perry. (Tr. 29) 
On February 7, 1975, oral argument was held on plaintiffs1 
motion for a summary judgment and defendant Slavens1 counsel1s 
motion to amend his pleadings. (Tr. 28) The Court orally pro-
nounced from the bench that Slavens1 answer be stricken and a de-
fault partial summary judgment was granted. Later, on March 10, 
1975, a default partial summary judgment was formally entered a-
gainst defendant Slavens because the file contained no justifica-
tion for Slavens1 nonappearance nor any justification for his fail-
ure to produce the requested documents. (Tr. 51) Slavens1 answer 
was ordered stricken, his default entered therein, and a default 
partial summary judgment of $3,841,66 (Tr. 65) was rendered against 
him, (Tr. 51) with the Court reserving the right to enter further • 
judgment against Slavens. 
The action is still proceeding as to the defendant Perry 
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based upon the complaint and defendant Perry's counterclaim, 
which is the same as the counterclaim of defendant Slavens. 
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POINT I 
SLAVENS NON-APPEARANCE AT HIS DEPOSITION AND HIS FAILURE TO 
PRODUCE DOCUMENTS WAS NOT WILLFUL, .THEREFORE, IT WAS ERROR FOR THE 
COURT TO ENTER SUCH A DRASTIC SANCTION AS A DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Judge Sorensen ordered the answer of defendant Slavens strick-
en because of his failure/ after being properly noticed, to appear 
at a deposition in a law suit filed in Utah County, which deposition 
was scheduled for April 26, 1974, in Salt Lake City, apparently for 
the convenience of plaintiffs1 counsel at a time when Slavens was 
residing in Wyoming. Slavens also failed to produce certain re-
quested documents at this scheduled deposition. The court1s.auth-
ority to impose such a drastic sanction, as a default judgment, 
was invoked under Rule 37 of the U.R.C.P* -
Changes have recently been made in both Utah Rule 37 and Fed-
eral Rule 37. Rule 37 imposes the necessary sanctions in.order to 
effectuate discovery. The 1970 amendments to the Federal Rule re-
placed the term "refused" with the term "failure" throughout Rule 
37. This was done in order to emphasize that imposing sanctions did 
not require willfullness but merely a failure to comply. After the 
1370 amendments, Federal Rule 37 now provides that any failure to 
appear at a deposition or to answer questions to interrogatories or 
to respond to requests for production will subject one to any one or 
more of the numerous sanctions in what is now (b)(2) of Federal Rule 
37. Effective June 1, 1972, Utah Rule 37, which imposes sanctions, 
was also changed so as to be identical to the previously changed 
Federal Rule 37. Judge Sorensen made his ruling under the author-
ity of Rule 37, U.R.C.P., which is now and was identical to the 
Federal Rule on sanctions. Therefore, it is appropriate for an 
-6-
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appellate court to examine how other courts have interpreted Fed-
eral Rule 37 as a guide to whether Judge Sorensen committed error. 
Under the old Federal Rule 37, which had contained the term 
"refusal" rather than "failure", courts had trouble formulating 
any clear definition of "willfulness" in regards to conduct. Un-
der the old rule in 19 62, the Fourth Circuit, .in Weston & Brooker 
Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 303 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1962), had 
interpreted willfulness under (d) of Rule 37 as a "conscious or in-
tentional failure to act as distinguished from an accidental or a 
voluntary noncompliance." The Fourth Circuit stated: 
The sanctions authorized by Rule 37(d) should 
not be applied in the absence of wilful failure to 
comply with the provisions regarding discovery; how-
ever 'wilful failure1 does not necessarily include a 
wrongful intention to disobey the rule. A conscious 
or intentional failure to act, as distinguished 
from an accidental or involuntary non-compliance, 
is sufficient to invoke the penalty. Id. at 92-93. 
In 1970, amendments deleted the word "willful", however, even 
after these 1970 amendments to Federal Rule 37, willful conduct 
was still required by courts before imposing such a severe sanc-
tion as a default judgment. There exists extensive authority that 
a willful refusal to appear at a deposition or to produce docu-
ments is a necesary prerequisite to the imposition of such a se-
vere sanction as a judgment by default. The Supreme Court of the 
United States in a case decided in 1958, in Societe Internationale 
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), held that willfulness continues to 
play a role along with various other factors in imposing sanctions. 
Even after the 1970 amendments to Federal Rule 37, courts still 
continued to require a standard of "willful conduct" as a prere-
quisite to imposing the severe sanctions provided for in (d)(2) 
of Rule 37. As authority, Slavens cites the case of Flaks v. 
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Koegel, 504 F.2d 702 (2nd Cir. 1974), in which the Second Circuit, 
In September, 1974, said: 
The argument that willful refusal to 
obey an order to respond to interrogatories or 
to appear for a deposition is not a necessary 
prerequisite to the imposition of any sanction 
under Rule 37 is premised on the position that 
the 19 70 amendments to Rule 37 eliminated from 
the Rule the term "willful," which had previous-
ly been employed to characterize the conduct 
which would trigger the sanctions of the Rule, 
We do not accept this argument. The 197 0 amend-
ments were intended to authorize the court, 
where it deemed appropriate, to impose more flex-
ible and softer sanctions for Rule 37 violations 
than theretofore provided. However, there was 
no intent to eliminate the willfulness element-
when the harsh sanction of the dismissal of a 
complaint or the striking of an answer was or-
dered. This is made clear in the note of the 
Advisory Committee on the Rules. The Committee 
stated: 
Two related changed are made in 
subdivision (d): the permissible sanc-
tions are broadened to include such 
orders "as are just"; and the require-
ment that the failure to . appear or res-
pond be "wilful" is eliminated. Al-
though Rule 37(d) in terms provides for 
only three sanctions, all rather severe, 
the courts have interpreted it as per-
mitting softer sanctions than those 
which it sets forth. . . . The rule is 
changed to provide the greater flexi-
bility as to sanctions which the cases 
show is needed. 
The resulting flexibility as to 
sanctions eliminates any need to retain 
the requirement that the failure to ap-
pear or respond be "wilful.". . . "Wil-
ful Iness" continues to play a role, 
along with various other factors, in 
the choice of sanctions. Thus, the 
scheme conforms to Rule 37(b) as con-
strued by the Supreme Court in Societe 
-Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 
208 [78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255] 
(1958). 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 2 8 U.S.C.A. 
Rule 37, at 45, 47 (Supp. 1974) (citations omit-
ted), (emphasis added) Id. at 708. 
Professor Moore, a leading authority on procedure, believes 
-8-
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that no court should impose such a drastic sanction as a default 
judgment, which is authorized by Rule 37, unless willfulness has 
been shown, 4 Moore, Federa .1 Practice, §33,28, n. 2; §37.04 n. 
2 (2nd Ed- 1950). For further support that such sanctions are 
imposed only for willful conduct, see Herald v. Computer Compon-
ents International, Inc., 252 S.2d 576 (Fla. 1971), in which the 
Florida court said: 
The sanctions provided under this rule, 
particularly the striking of pleadings and dis-
missal of a cause should be imposed only in the 
exceptional case. The federal courts in inter-
preting the federal counterpart to Rule 1.380 
have had considerable difficulty in delineating 
exceptional cases. There have been indications 
that the exceptional case is where the recalcit-
rant party has acted in wilful disregard of or 
with gross indifference to an order of the court 
requiring discovery. . . Id. at 577. 
In Societe Internationale, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court said that "willfulness was relevant to the selection of san-
ctions." As late as September, 1974, the Second Circuit had once 
again affirmed willfulness as a necessary element for the imposi-
tion of such a severe sanction as a default judgment. In Hart v. 
Wolffs 489 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1971), the Alaska Supreme Court said: 
The next question is whether dismis-
sal was a proper sanction for refusal to comply 
with the order to produce the documents. First, 
it should be noted that application of Rule 37 
sanctions against a party who has failed to make 
discovery is not proper unless the court finds 
that there has been a "willful refusal on the 
part of a party ordered to make discovery***." 
Oaks v. Rojcewicz, 409 P.2d 839, 840 (Alaska 
1966) (emphasis added by court) Id. at 118. 
For further support that willfulness is the required standard 
of conduct necessary in order to impose such a severe sanction as 
a default judgment, see Marriott Homes v. Hanson, 50 F.R.D. 396 
(W.D. Mo. 1970), Morton v. Retail Credit Co., 128 Ga.App. 446, 
'. -9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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196 S.E.2d 902 (1973); Cinelli V, Radcliffe, 317 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1970)? 
Robison v. Transamerica Ins, Co,, 368 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1966); 
Patterson v. CI.T. Corp., 352 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1965); Gill v. 
Stolow, 240 F.2d 669 (2nd Cir. 1957); Foster v. Brooks, 7 Ariz.App. 
320, 438 P.2d 952 (1968); Oaks v. Rojcewicz, 409 P.2d 839 (1966); Z 
Zakroff v. May, 8 Ariz.App. 101, 443 P.2d 916 (1968). 
The Utah Supreme Court has never directly ruled on whether 
the standard of conduct in imposing sanctions is one of willful-
ness. However, in dictum, in Tucker Realty Inc. v. Nunley, 16 
Utah2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), the Utah Supreme Court clearly in-
dicated that any such conduct must be willful in order to impose 
such a severe sanction. 
Not only must the conduct be willful, but the trial record 
must clearly reveal such willfulness. The record on appeal in 
the instant case fails to show any such willful misconduct by 
defendant Slavens. 
A case which is similar to the instant case was Swindle v. 
Reid, 242 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1971), in which a plaintiff-taxpayer 
sought to enjoin the assessment and collection of certain intan-
gible personal property taxes levied in Palm Beach, Florida. The 
defendant-tax assessor initiated extensive discovery procedures, 
including a motion to produce certain documents. The motion was 
granted and the plaintiff-taxpayer was ordered to produce the re-
quested documents. She failed to produce certain documents and 
an order of dismissal was entered from which an appeal was taken. 
The Florida court said: 
We deem it important to note that the 
order of dismissal in this case did not con-
tain any finding by the trial court that the 
• - 1 0 - • 
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plaintiff's failure to fully comply with the 
order to produce was due to a refusal to do 
so. Instead, the court merely found that the 
plaintiff had shown an insufficient excuse for 
her failure to comply, a distinction which we 
feel to be significant. The record before 
us is certainly susceptible of the reasonable 
interpretation that plaintiff's failure to pro-
duce the documents was occasioned by events be-
yond her control. Since the trial court did 
not expressly find, and the record does not 
conclusively reveal, that the plaintiff's fail-
ure to produce was a refusal to obey, we hold 
that the court abused its discretion in dis-
missing the complaint with prejudice. Id. at 
753. 
In the instant case, the trial court likewise found the file 
contained no justification for Slavens1 failure to comply. Judge 
Sorensen failed to find Slavens' non-appearance was willful be-, 
cause of a failure to comply. The absence of any justification 
in the record is not equivalent to willfulness. This is a very 
»meaningful distinction. The record in the instant case fails to 
show any willful refusal whatsoever by Slavens to comply with dis-
covery and the absence of any justification in the record certainly 
cannot be equated with a willful refusal. For further support that 
the record must clearly reveal willful misconduct, see Gill v. Sto-
low, 240 F.2d 669 (2nd Cir. 1957), in which the Second Circuit said 
the record failed to show any willful default for failure to attend 
the deposition. 
The ultimate sanction, dismissal of the action for failure to 
appear, flis the most severe sanction that a court may impose that 
its use must be tempered by careful exercise of judicial discre-
tion." Durgin v. Graham, 372 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1969). In Firo-
ved v. General Motors Corp,, 277 Minn. 278, 152N.W.2d 364 (1967), 
the Minnesota Supreme Court said: 
An order of dismissal on proce-
dural grounds runs counter to the pri-
-i i -
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mary objective of the law to dispose 
of cases on the merits. Since a dis-
missal with prejudice operates as an 
adjudication on the merits, it is the 
most punitive sanction which can be im-
posed for noncompliance with the rules 
or order of the court or for failure to 
prosecute. It should therefore be 
granted only under exceptional cir-
cumstances* Id. at 368. 
Also see Scherrer v. Plaza Marina Commercial Corp. , 36 Cal. 
App.3d 520, 94 Cal.Rptr. 85 (1971), in which the California court 
said: 
The ultimate sanction of default a-
gainst a litigant who wilfully fails to appear 
for the taking of his deposition is a drastic 
penalty which should be sparingly used; ordin-
arily, it should be used only when lesser sanc-
tions have failed (Crummer v. Beeler, 185 Cal. 
App.2d 851, 8 Cal.Rptr. 698). As the court 
said in Caryl Richards, Inc. v. Superior Court, 
188 Cal.App.2d 300, 303 10 Cal.Rptr. 337, 379: 
"One of the principal purposes 
of the Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., 
§§2016-2035) is to enable a party to 
obtain evidence in the control of his 
adversary in order to further the ef-
ficient, economical disposition of 
cases according to right and justice 
on,the merits. [Citations omitted.} 
Its purpose is not fto provide a wea-
pon for punishment, forfeiture and the 
avoidance of a trial on the merits.'" 
(emphasis by court) Id. at 87. 
The drastic sanction of dismissal has been invoked in the instant 
case as, in fact, a weapon for punishment in which a trial on the 
merits has been avoided. This inference is especially evident 
when such a severe sanction is invoked against a defendant for a 
single failure to comply. It is not proper that litigation be 
treated as a game, but rather litigation should be disposed of 
wherever possible on its merits. 
In Rapoport y. Sirott, 418 Pa. 50, 209 A.2d 421 (1965), a de-
fault judgment was taken against the defendant in a trespass action 
-12-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for failure to appear at the taking of his deposition. On appeal, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the default judgment stat-
ing: 
The entry of a default judgment by 
way of sanction for failure of a party to appear 
for the taking of his deposition is a drastic 
remedy and should be entered only in the clear-
est of cases. Unless the failure of a party to 
appear for the taking of a deposition is wilful, 
i.e., deliberate and intentional, and his duty 
to appear is clear and the record clearly and 
unequivocally reveals such to be the case, a 
default judgment should not be entered. Id. 
at 423. 
It was error for a default judgment to be entered against de-
fendant Slavens for failure to appear at his deposition because in-
voking such a drastic sanction is proper only in the clearest of 
cases in which evidence conclusively establishes that a party has 
willfully frustrated the discovery process and even then, such 
willfulness must be clearly set forth in the record. The standard 
of conduct for dismissal of an action is one of willfulness, which 
must be clearly evidenced in the record. Neither is present in 
the instant case, therefore, it was error for the court to enter 
a default judgment. 
POINT II 
IT WAS ERROR TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE ANY SUCH 
SEVERE SANCTION IS PROPER ONLY AFTER A PATTERN OF REPEATED AND 
PERSISTANT DEFIANCE OF DISCOVERY AND SLAVENS1 SOLE FAILURE TO 
APPEAR AT A DEPOSITION FAILS TO ESTABLISH ANY SUCH DEFIANT PAT-
T E R N . ..'.'•.'•;•.'•."• 
Even where there has been clear non-compliance by failure to 
appear for the taking of a deposition or a failure to produce 
specified documents, the party who has so failed to comply is 
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usually allowed at least another opportunity to comply before a 
default judgment is entered. See Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effec-
tuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Colum*L.Rev. 480 (1958), v/hich states: 
So ingrained has become this practive of 
granting a second chance that in Gill v. Stolow, 
the recusant defendant could argue, with fair 
justification, that in no case had a federal-
court defaulted a defendant for a first failure 
to appear for pretrial examination. ^ 
73 
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, pp. 30-31, Gill v. Stolow, 
240 F.2d 669 (2d Cir- 1957); see e.g., Mooney v. Central 
Motor Lines, Inc., 222 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1955); Delphy v. 
Bernuth, Lembcke Co., 217 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1954); Dicto-
graph Products, Inc. v. Kentworth Corp., 7F.R.D. 543 (W. 
D. Ky. 1947). 
Also see 4 Moore, Federal Practice, §37.03, n. 35: 
. . .most cases in which dismissal or de-
fault judgment is ordered under Rule 37(d) are 
ones in which there has been repeated and aggra-
vated refusal to make discovery, (emphasis added) 
In practice, courts have invested themselves with a wide 
range of discretion under subdivision (d) of Rule 37. In a large 
number of the motions brought under this subdivision, the courts 
have ordered conditional dismissals or defaults. The typical or-
der will grant a motion for dismissal or default unless the party 
appears for deposition or responds to interrogatories, within a 
prescribed period. . 
Defendant Slavens argues that it is a most unusual case in 
which a default judgment will be entered without first giving the 
delinquent party another opportunity to respond. The courts have 
almost uniformly exhibited a generous attitude to the recusant par-
ty and have deemed it better to withhold the thunder bolt of a de-
fault judgment on condition of future compliance rather than to 
foreclose a determination of the matter on its merits. Expressions 
-14- .. .  
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are very frequent that the drastic provision of a default judgment 
should be invoked only when a deliberate or flagrant attitude is 
demonstrated. The Second Circuit in Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669 
(2nd Cir. 1957), stated: 
In final analysis, a court has the respon- . 
sibility to do justice between man and man; and 
general principles cannot justify denial of a 
partyfs fair day in court except upon a serious 
showing of willful default. Id. at 670 
In Schacht v. Javits, 53 F.R.D. 321,(S.D. N.Y. 1971), the 
court said sanctions may be invoked "when there has been a pattern 
of abuse." In Goldstein v. Goldstein, 284 S.2d 227 (Fla. 1973), 
the Florida court stated in regard to invoking such a sanction 
for a single failure to perform that: 
The sanctions are set up as a means to an 
end, not the end itself. The end is compliance. 
The sanctions should be invoked only in flagrant 
cases, certainly in no less than aggravated 
cases, and then only after the Court has given 
the defaulting party a reasonable opportunity 
to conform after originally failing or even re-
fusing to appear. This is unmistakably the 
trend of judicial thinking in Florida on the 
1
 sanction1 Rule. Id. at 227. 
In Lizak v. Zadrozny, 4 IU.App. 1023, 283 N.E.2d 252 (1972), 
a party failed to appear at a deposition after receiving a proper 
notice. A default judgment was entered. On appeal, the appellate 
court stated "some further effort to obtain compliance should have 
been made before imposing a severe penalty." For additional sup-
port that Slavens should be given one more additional chance to 
redeem himself before such a drastic sanction as a default judg-
ment is entered, see the following case authority: Housing Author-
ity of City of Alameda v. Gomez, 26 Cal.App.3d 366, 102 Cal.Rptr. 
657 (1972); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 284 S.2d 227 (Fla. 1973); Cin-
elli v. Radcliffe, 35 A.D.2d 829, 3317 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1970); Bender 
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v. Pfotenhauer, 21 Ill.App.3d 127, 315 N.E.2d 137 (1974); Rapo-
port v, Sirott, 418 Pa. 50, 209 A.2d 424 (1965); Beal v. Reinert-
son, 298 Minn. 542, 225 N-W.2d 57 (1974). 
Slavens failure to appear once certainly does not constitute 
any such pattern of defiance. It was error to enter a default 
judgment for this single failure to comply with discovery because 
the overwhelming case authority accords a recusant party a second 
change, or at most, the court should only enter a conditional de-
fault judgment. 
POINT III 
IT WAS ERROR TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE BASIC 
PREMISE OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS THAT DISPUTES 
SHOULD BE RESOLVED ON THEIR MERITS RATHER THAN UPON TECHNICALI-
TIES. 
There is an overall policy that the function of procedural 
rules is to reach the merits of a dispute. Literally, the first 
rule of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all the 
rules of procedure are to be "liberally construed to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive of every action." The Utah rules 
are, in fact, saturated with the premises that they exist to aid, 
not abort, the determination of legal controversies on their 
merits. The Utah Rules of Procedure reduce to a minimum the num-
ber of snares over which litigants might trip on their way to the 
trial courtroom. The Supreme Court of Florida has expressed the 
same idea in Cabot v. Clearwater Construction Co., 89 S.2d 662 
(Fla. 1956): 
11
 * * *No longer are we concerned with the 
'tricks and technicalities of the trade1. 
The trial of a lawsuit should be a sincere 
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effort to arrive at the truth. It is no 
longer a game of chess in which the tech-
nique of the maneuver captures the prize." 
Id. at 664. 
Also see Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohn & Sons, Inc.
 ; 53 F.R.D. 
320 (Ed. Wis. 1971) . 
The Utah Rules of Procedure are to be construed as a unit. 
The Utah Rules are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action on its merits. It was error 
to enter a default judgment against Slavens for failure to appear 
at a deposition because any such default judgment resolves the dis-
pute upon a technicality, and not upon the merits of the controver-
sy, therefore, any such default judgment is fundamentally contrary 
to the basic premise upon which the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
are founded. 
POINT IV 
IT WAS ERROR TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE ANY SUCH 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED WITHOUT A HEARING ON ITS MERITS IS A 
DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
There exists a constitutional "due process" limitation on the 
sanctions imposed under Rule 37, when such sanctions terminate 
either an action entirely or partially. The Second Circuit discus-
sed these constitutional limitations in Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 
702 (2nd. Cir. 1974), stating: 
The Rule has constitutional limitations 
which were noted in Mr. Justice Harlanfs opin-
ion for the Court in Societe Internationale v. 
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 
L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958), in which he stated; 
The provisions of Rule 37 which are 
here involved must be read in light of 
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the provisions of the Fifth Amendment 
. that no person shall be deprived of pro-
perty without due process of .law, and 
more particularly against the opinions 
of this Court in Hovey v. Elliott, 167 
U.S. 409 [17 S.Ct. 841, 42 L.Ed- 215] 
and Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 
212 U.S. 322 [29 S. Ct. 370, 53 L.Ed. 
530]. These decisions establish that 
there are constitutional limitations 
upon the power of courts, even in aid 
of their own valid processes, to dismiss 
an action without affording a party the 
opportunity for a. hearing on the merits 
of his cause. The authors of Rule 37 
were well aware of these constitutional 
considerations. See Notes of Advisory 
Committee on Rules, Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. 
(1952 ed.), p. 4325. 
On the record before it, the Court decided 
that Rule 37 should not be construed 
to authorize dismissal of this complaint 
because of petitioner's noncompliance 
with a pretrial production order when 
it has been established that failure to 
comply has been due to inability, and 
not to will fulness, bad faith, or any 
fault of petitioner. 
356 U.S. at 212, 78 S.Ct. at 1096 (footnote omit-
ted). Id. at 708 and 709. 
Thus, although the United States Supreme Court, in form, avoided 
any direct resolution of the due process question, still the con-
struction placed upon Rule 37(b) by the United States Supreme 
Court clearly indicates that a dismissal of the complaint or the 
entry of a default judgment for failure to comply with the dis-
covery rules would be improper unless the circumstances of the 
noncompliance afford a reasonable basis to presume an admission 
by one of a lack of merit in the claim or defense. As a practi-
cal matter, therefore, any reasonable belief that one's claim or 
defense has merit would doubtless be found to exist whenever fail-
ure to comply with discovery was shown not to be willful. The 
record in the instant case, standing alone, would certainly sup-
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port any finding that Slavens1 failure to appear did not arise 
through willful defiance,.therefore, the court's imposing the ul-
timate sanction of a default judgment against Slavens is a denial 
of his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully submits that the default partial 
summary judgment should be reversed and the controversy decided 
on its merits. 
Respectfully 
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Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, 
Bert Slavens 
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